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A Triggered Nation: An Argument for
Extreme Risk Protection Orders
by CAROLINE SHEN*

Introduction
In 2017, 15,577 people were killed by guns in the United States, 31,170
people were injured, and 346 mass shootings1 took place.2 Of those killed
or injured, 732 were children eleven years of age or younger and 3,235 were
teens between the ages of 12 and 17. By the end of 2018, there were 56,868
incidents involving guns, leading to 14,618 deaths and 28,156 injuries.3
There were 340 mass shootings in total, and 665 children and 2,827 teens
were killed or injured by gun violence.
While it is easy to read these statistics as mere numbers, the true gravity
of this toll on American lives is more apparent when compared to the
statistics of gun violence in other first-world countries. Nearly half of the
number of civilian-owned guns in the world can be found in the U.S., even
though the U.S. only makes up 4.4 percent of the world’s population.4 As a
result of this pervasiveness of gun ownership, the U.S. has had six times as
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1. While there is no precise legal definition for what constitutes a mass shooting, the term
has been previously defined by the Congressional Research Service as “a multiple homicide
incident in which four or more victims are murdered with firearms, within one event, and in one or
more locations in close proximity.” WILLIAM J. KROUSE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R44126, MASS MURDER WITH FIREARMS: INCIDENTS AND VICTIMS, 1999–2013 2 (2015), https://f
as.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44126.pdf.
2. Past Summary Ledgers, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE (Mar. 8, 2018), http://www.gunviolen
cearchive.org/past-tolls.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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5. German Lopez, America’s unique gun violence problem, explained in 17 maps and
charts, VOX (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/2/16399418/usgun-violence-statistics-maps-charts.
6. AMA calls gun violence “a public health crisis,” AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS’N (June 14,
2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/ama-calls-gun-violence-public-health-crisis.
7. Id.
8. See, Erin Dooley, Here’s why the federal government can’t study gun violence, ABC
NEWS (Oct. 6, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/US/federal-government-study-gun-violence/story?id
=50300379.
9. Id.
10. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
11. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
12. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.
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many gun-related deaths as Canada and nearly 16 times as many as
Germany, both of which have restrictions on gun ownership.5
The American Medical Association has characterized gun violence in
the United States as “a public health crisis.”6 Yet, Congress has prohibited
the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) from conducting
further research into the extent of the effects of gun violence in the United
States.7 Through the tireless efforts of the National Rifles Association
(“NRA”), a provision known as the “Dickey Amendment”—named after a
Republican representative from Arkansas who proclaimed himself a “point
man for the NRA”—was snuck into an appropriations bill and first signed
into law by President Clinton.8 The provision stipulated that “none of the
funds made available for injury prevention and control at the [CDC] may be
used to advocate or promote gun control.”9
Meanwhile, the seminal Supreme Court decision, District of Columbia
v. Heller,10 remains the utmost authority on the interpretation of the Second
Amendment today. The decision was a dramatic departure from the Court’s
previous interpretation of the Second Amendment in United States v. Miller.
In Miller, the Court unanimously ruled that the “obvious purpose” of the
Second Amendment was not to ensure the rights of everyday citizens to own
guns, but rather to “assure the continuation and render possible the
effectiveness of [the state militia].”11
In 2008, the Court made a complete turnaround in Heller. Though
Justice Scalia began his interpretation of the Second Amendment by
acknowledging that the prefatory clause states and clarifies the purpose of
the Amendment,12 he then went on to disregard it entirely. Despite clear
language in the prefatory clause indicating its application to “[a] well
regulated militia,” Scalia quickly moved his opinion to a more in depth
reading of the operative clause regarding “the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms.” Using a unique concoction of textual and purposive statutory
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13. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581.
14. Dennis A. Henigan, Symposium: The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms
After D.C. v. Heller: The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1171, 1209 (2009).
15. Heller, 554 U.S at 626–27.
16. Id. at 627 n.26.
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interpretation, combined with what can be characterized as original intent
(even though he specifically advocates against such interpretation), he
arrived at the conclusion that the use of the words “the people” in the
operative clause of the Amendment reflects a “strong presumption”13 that the
Amendment protects the right of individual citizens to bear arms.
Since Heller, the NRA has latched onto the decision as proof that the
Constitution guarantees the individual’s right to gun ownership and that this
right cannot be infringed upon in any capacity. Gun control advocates, on
the other hand, continue to criticize the decision for “def[ying] constitutional
text and history to create a new private right to be armed.”14 More optimistic
gun control advocates, however, emphasize certain holes in the decision as
avenues through which to continue the fight for common sense gun laws.
One such avenue which remains to be definitively addressed by the Supreme
Court is what it considers a “presumptively lawful” regulation. While the
Court offered examples—including prohibiting firearm possession by felons
and the mentally ill, forbidding firearm possession in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings, and imposing conditions on the
commercial sale of firearms15—it set no boundaries within which to consider
such regulations in practice and merely notes that this list is not exhaustive.16
This Note focuses on a new type of law which utilizes these gaps in the
Heller decision, capitalizing on the Supreme Court’s allowance of
prohibiting firearm possession by felons and the mentally ill. The purpose
of this Note is to argue for the crucial need for Extreme Risk Protection
Orders and the feasibility of passing such laws in each of the twelve federal
circuits. This involves an analysis of possible issues and/or constitutional
questions that may arise or be used to argue against the implementation of
such laws in a given jurisdiction.
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I. The United States is Unique in its Lack of
Common Sense Gun Control
Studies have substantially demonstrated that more gun control
correlates with fewer firearm deaths.17 For instance, one study done for the
American Public Health Association revealed that each percentage point
increase in gun ownership correlated with a nearly equal percentage increase
in the firearm homicide rate.18 The NRA and its supporters often counter
this clear correlation by arguing that there is simply more crime in the U.S.
than in other countries, and that therefore it is inaccurate to tie higher death
rates to the prevalence of guns. However, a number of studies have shown
otherwise. For example, the research illustrated in the book Crime is Not the
Problem by Berkeley’s Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, shows that
other crimes, such as robbery and assault, occur at equivalent rates, if not
higher, in several Western nations.19
The effects of the lack of stricter regulations on gun ownership in the
U.S. are perhaps clearest when compared to countries with such stricter
regulations. One go-to example is Japan. Out of its population of 127
million people, Japan suffers about 10 or less gun deaths per year.20 This is
a shockingly small number when compared to the roughly 37,200 gun deaths
in the U.S. each year21 out of a population of roughly 328 million.22 Japan
achieves this low number at least in part through its notably strict regulations
on the ownership of firearms by the general population, as well as limited
possession among its police force.23 In order to own a gun in Japan, one
must attend an all-day class, pass a written test, pass a shooting-range test

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 96 Side B
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17. See e.g., John W. Schoen, States with strict gun laws have fewer firearm deaths. Here’s
how your state stacks up, CNBC (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/27/states-withstrict-gun-laws-have-fewer-firearms-deaths-heres-how-your-state-stacks-up.html (analyzing the
results of a study conducted by the CDC tracking firearm deaths in each state, and a study conducted
by Boston University’s School of Public Health tracking different provisions of gun laws in each
state, and combining this data to show the number of gun deaths versus gun laws in each state).
18. Michael Siegel et al., The Relationship Between Gun Ownership and Firearm Homicide
Rates in the United States, 1981-2010, AJPH (Oct. 9, 2013), http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/fu
ll/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301409.
19. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM (1997).
20. Chris Weller, Japan has almost completely eliminated gun deaths—here’s how,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/gun-control-how-japan-hasalmost-completely-eliminated-gun-deaths-2017-10.
21. Laura Santhanam, There’s a new global ranking of gun deaths. Here’s where the U.S.
stands, KQED (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/theres-a-new-global-rankin
g-of-gun-deaths-heres-where-the-u-s-stands.
22. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last visited Jan. 6, 2019),
https://www.census.gov/popclock.
23. Weller, supra note 20.
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24. Weller, supra note 20.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Maggie Fox, Australian gun laws stopped 16 mass shootings, new calculations show,
NBC NEWS (last updated Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/australian
-gun-laws-stopped-16-mass-shootings-new-calculations-show-n855946.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Fewer gun deaths in states with most gun laws, study finds, NBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://vitals.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/06/17213303-fewer-gun-deaths-in-states-with-mostgun-laws-study-finds?lite.
33. Id.
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with a score of at least 95 percent, pass a mental-health evaluation, and pass
an extensive background check.24 Even after this extensive application
process, individuals are only allowed to purchase shotguns and air rifles.25
They are further required to retake both the initial class and the initial written
exam every three years if they wish to maintain their license.26
Australia is another example of the results that can be achieved even
when less restrictions are placed on gun ownership. After a mass shooting
at a cafe in 1996, which led to the deaths of 35 people and the injury of 23,
the country enacted a slew of laws to ensure such a massacre never occurred
again.27 These included “uniform gun registration, repudiation of selfdefense as a legitimate reason to hold a firearm license, locked storage, a ban
on private gun sales and civilian ownership of semiautomatic rifles and
pump-action shotguns, and standardized penalties.”28 Since the enactment
of these laws, no mass shooting has occurred in Australia.29 In comparison,
before 1996, approximately three mass shootings occurred every year.30 By
projecting this rate forward, the Australian Coalition for Gun Control
concluded that approximately 16 mass shootings have been avoided in
Australia as of February 2018.31 Despite the difference in the level of
restrictive gun legislation in comparison to that in Japan, the increase of
ownership and purchase restrictions in Australia similarly correlated with a
drastic decrease in the gun-related deaths that occur in the country each year.
Perhaps even more persuasive is what has been shown within the U.S.,
in states that have the most gun laws. In a study conducted by Dr. Eric W.
Fleegler and his colleagues at Boston Children’s Hospital, researchers found
that states with more restrictive gun laws collectively have a 42 percent lower
rate of gun-related deaths when compared to states with the fewest number
of gun laws.32 They further noted that states with the lowest gun-ownership
rates also have the lowest gun-mortality rates.33
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Arguably the most significant barrier to gun control legislation is the
existence and vast influence of the gun lobby, which is unique to the United
States. In the 2016 election, the NRA contributed $3.1 million to Donald
Trump’s campaign.34 It has contributed at least another $4.1 million to
current members of Congress as of October 2017.35 Beyond mere campaign
contributions, the NRA also exerts powerful influence over its more than five
million members. It constantly communicates with its members about gun
issues and advises them on how to vote and which campaigns to finance on
an individual capacity.36 This political power allows the NRA to block any
piece of gun legislation it deems too restrictive on the Second Amendment
right of its constituents.

II. Why Extreme Risk Protection Orders?

02/26/2019 14:13:21

34. Sarah Binder, Three reasons you should expect congressional gridlock on gun control,
WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/
02/27/yes-you-can-expect-congressional-gridlock-on-gun-regulations-these-are-the-3-biggestbarriers-to-action/?utm_term=.358e86cc2b4d.
35. Aaron Williams, Have your representatives in Congress received donations from the
NRA?, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2018), http://linkis.com/washingtonpost.com/aPeFE.
36. Leigh Ann Caldwell, How the NRA Exerts Influence Beyond Political Contributions,
NBC NEWS (June 15, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/orlando-nightclub-massacre/nras-political-influence-far-goes-beyond-campaign-contributions-n593051.
37. See Jonathan M. Metzl et al., Mental Illness, Mass Shootings, and the Politics of
American Firearms, 105(2) AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 240–59 (Feb. 2015). See also Ann Coulter,
Guns Don’t Kill People, the Mentally Ill Do (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.anncoulter.com/columns/2
013-01-16.html.
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One form of common sense gun legislation which has the potential to
bridge the gap between NRA supporters and gun control advocates are
Extreme Risk Protection Orders (“ERPOs”), otherwise known as Gun
Violence Restraining Orders. ERPOs are protective orders issued by a court
aimed at prohibiting certain individuals from owning or possessing firearms
and ammunition. They are intended to provide community members with a
formal legal process through which to prevent gun violence before it occurs.
While other types of gun control laws are often met with much
resentment from pro-gun advocates, ERPOs target the issue of gun violence
in such a way as to consolidate differing opinions across political platforms.
They are aimed at a narrow sect of the population which exhibits a risk to
themselves or others, individuals who pro-gun advocates point to as the
cause of all mass shootings, after the fact.37 Even John McCain, who has
received the highest amount of NRA funding over the course of his career of
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any other current House or Senate member at $7,740,521,38 has urged for
“sensible laws so that crazy people can’t get guns.”39 Despite his
troublesome use of the term “crazy people,” his argument runs parallel to the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Heller: A piece of legislation may be justifiable
if it restricts certain dangerous individuals from possessing firearms. But
how can these dangerous individuals be readily identified?
Studies conducted by the Consortium for Risk-Based Firearms Policy
in 2013 have shown that individuals who are engaged in certain dangerous
behaviors are significantly more likely to be a danger to themselves or others
within the near future.40 Recent mass shootings, such as the one in Isla Vista,
California in 2015, have further shown that family and close friends are often
the first to notice such dangerous behaviors prior to an individual’s
involvement in a mass shooting. The shooter in the Isla Vista incident, Elliot
Rodger, spent over a year planning his attack.41 This premeditation included
amassing numerous firearms and training himself to kill as many people as
possible. There were at least 14 separate instances, prior to the shooting,
during which local deputies were notified of Rodger’s dangerous behavior,
including a welfare check requested by his concerned mother.42 Rodger’s
parents also tried to contact his therapist three weeks before the shooting due
to their concerns about his behavior. Though the therapist contacted the
police, none of the parties had the legal means by which to remove Rodger’s
access to guns, which subsequently led to the deaths of three people, the
wounding of 13 others, and ultimately Rodger’s suicide.43
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) conducted a study in June
of 2018 detailing certain dangerous behaviors commonly exhibited by active
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 98 Side A
02/26/2019 14:13:21

38. David Leonhardt et al., Thoughts and Prayers and N.R.A. Funding, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/04/opinion/thoughts-prayers-nra-funding-se
nators.html.
39. Tania Lombrozo, Is Gun Violence Due To Dangerous People Or Dangerous Guns?, NPR
(Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2015/08/31/436264866/is-gun-violence-dueto-dangerous-people-or-dangerous-guns.
40. See, Consortium for Risk-Based Firearms Policy, Guns, Public Health, and Mental
Illness: An Evidence-Based Approach for State Policy, JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR GUN POL’Y AND
RESEARCH (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johns-hopkins-ce
nter-for-gun-policy-and-research/publications/GPHMI-State.pdf.
41. Joseph Serna, Elliot Rodger meticulously planned Isla Vista rampage, report says, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-santa-barbara-isla-vista-ram
page-investigation-20150219-story.html.
42. Id.
43. Joe Mozingo, Frantic parents of shooting suspect raced to Isla Vista during rampage,
L.A. TIMES, (May 25, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-frantic-parents-islavista-shootings-20140525-story.html.
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44. James Silver et al., A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the United
States Between 2000 and 2013, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (June 2018), https://www.f
bi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us-2000-2013.pdf/view.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Silver, supra note 44.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018).
49. Florida student Emma Gonzalez to lawmakers and gun advocates: ‘We call BS’, CNN
(Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/17/us/florida-student-emma-gonzalez-speech/inde
x.html.
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shooters just prior to an attack.44 The study, which examined 63 active
shooting incidents in the U.S. between 2000 and 2013, pointed to a common
history among a majority of active shooters of “abusive, harassing, and
oppressive” behaviors.45 Such behaviors manifested most commonly in the
form of declining mental health, injury to or lack of interpersonal
relationships, discussion of the planned attack, and suicidal ideation.46 On
average, each active shooter in the study exhibited 4.7 examples of such
concerning behavior before committing their attacks and 77 percent spent a
week or more planning these attacks.47 The study also noted that those most
likely to identify these examples of concerning behavior are family and
friends closest to the potential shooter.
Despite these indications of noticeable behaviors and the ability of
those closest to the individual to identify such behaviors, most jurisdictions
provide no legal means by which family, close friends, or law enforcement
officials can restrict a dangerous individual from accessing and obtaining
firearms. Under federal law, an individual suffering from mental instability
or mental illness has equal access to purchase or possess firearms unless the
individual has been involuntarily committed to a mental institution, been
found not guilty by reason of insanity, or undergone some other formalized
court proceeding regarding his or her mental illness.48
However, a new trend is on the horizon. In the last two years, a number
of states have begun to pass ERPO laws, and the momentum is building for
other states to follow suit. Such legislation exists in California, Washington,
Oregon, Florida, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, and Massachusetts. Sadly,
the passing of such legislation often occurs in the wake of a mass shooting
within that state. In her speech following the deadliest school shootings in
American history,49 Stoneman Douglas High School senior, Emma
Gonzalez, called attention to the fact that the shooter was known to be a
danger to others. In her words, “[n]eighbors and classmates knew he was a
big problem. We [reported his erratic behavior] time and time again. Since
he was in middle school. It was no surprise to anyone who knew him to hear
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that he was the shooter.”50 The #NeverAgain movement started by Gonzalez
and the other students of Stoneman Douglas has led to countless marches
across the nation in an effort to demand more common sense gun laws. As
a result, on March 7, 2018, Senator Marco Rubio (who has received the sixth
highest amount of NRA contributions in the Senate at $3,303,35551) held a
news conference proposing that Florida pass an ERPO law, saying “it would
be a tool . . . [to prevent] dangerous individuals from being able to take the
next step and actually take the lives of innocent people.”52

III. The Purpose and Process of Obtaining an ERPO

02/26/2019 14:13:21

50. Florida student Emma Gonzalez to lawmakers and gun advocates, supra note 49.
51. Leonhardt et al., supra note 38.
52. Alex Leary, Rubio, Nelson pitch idea to encourage states to adopt ‘gun violence
restraining orders’, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), http://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics
/buzz/2018/03/07/rubio-nelson-pitch-idea-to-encourage-states-to-adopt-gun-violence-restrainingorders/.
53. CAL. PEN. CODE § 18100 (West 2014).
54. CAL. PEN. CODE § 29805 (West 2011).
55. CAL. PEN. CODE § 18175 (West 2014).
56. CAL. PEN. CODE § 18120 (West 2014).
57. CAL. PEN. CODE § 18205 (West 2014).
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California’s ERPO law53 is worth detailing because it offers a
framework with which to think about ERPOs generally. California modeled
its law on existing state legislation which prohibits those charged with
domestic violence from owning and possessing firearms.54 Under
California’s ERPO law, an immediate family member or a law enforcement
officer may request a gun violence protective order to prohibit an individual
“from having in his or her custody or control, owning, purchasing,
possessing, or receiving any firearms or ammunition”55 for a period of one
year. A temporary ex parte order may also be issued by the court to prohibit
the subject of the petition from purchasing or possessing firearms and
ammunition prior to the hearing for a one-year protective order, if the court
deems this necessary based on the circumstances.
Upon the issuance of a one-year protective order (or earlier if an ex
parte order is issued), the court will order the respondent to surrender all
firearms and ammunition within their control, possession, or ownership to
their local law enforcement agency or otherwise to provide a receipt showing
the sale of those firearms to a licensed firearm dealer.56 Any purchase or
possession of a firearm or ammunition following the issuance of the
protective order will constitute a misdemeanor.57 The individual will
subsequently be prohibited from purchasing or possessing a firearm or
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ammunition for an additional five years, starting on the date the existing
protective order expires. At any time during the one-year period, the subject
of the protective order may submit one written request for a hearing to
terminate the order based on an argument that he or she does not pose—or
no longer poses—a threat to themselves or others.58
In the three months before the order is due to expire, the petitioner may
request a renewal of the restraining order for another year.59 If the order is
terminated or expires without being renewed, the law enforcement agency
will notify the respondent that he or she may request the return of their
firearms or ammunition.

IV. Passing an ERPO Law is Feasible in Each of the
Twelve Federal Circuits

A. United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
1. United States v. Torres-Rosario
Defendant, Torres-Rosario, was arrested for the sale and possession of
drugs, and indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).60 His primary argument was that § 922(g)(1)
constituted an unconstitutional categorical ban, particularly in his case
CAL. PEN. CODE § 18185 (West 2014).
CAL. PEN. CODE § 18190 (West 2014).
United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 2011).

02/26/2019 14:13:21

58.
59.
60.
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Many circuits—namely the First, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits—have considered Second Amendment challenges in the context of
domestic violence restraining orders, upon which ERPOs are based. Cases
about 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and 922(g)(9) are therefore particularly
analogous and suggestive of the circuits’ expected decisions if an ERPO law
is introduced and challenged in those circuits. Similarly analogous are cases
related to individuals (1) previously involuntarily committed to a mental
institution, (2) previously convicted of a misdemeanor felony, (3) who are
known substance abusers, and (4) who are otherwise deemed a danger to
themselves or others. Together, these make up most of the Second
Amendment case law considered thus far in each of the twelve circuits.
From the case law examined in the following sub-sections, it appears
that ERPOs are likely to be upheld as constitutional in each of the twelve
circuits because (1) they are narrowly tailored to accomplish a legitimate
government interest and (2) the limit on one’s Second Amendment right to
bear arms is minimal and temporary.
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because though he had prior convictions, none were for violent felonies.61
The court considered a decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court,
wherein a specific felony conviction was deemed insufficient to deprive the
defendant of his Second Amendment rights.62 However, this decision was
criticized because it urged a case-by-case analysis, which the court in TorresRosario believed to be too inconsistent and conducive to administrative
issues in practice.63
The court also considered the argument that “felons are more likely to
commit violent crimes than are other law-abiding citizens,” but conceded
that the Heller decision did not specifically allow for a categorical ban in
cases that involve “tame and technical” activities.64 However, the court
ultimately reasoned that this was not the case here. The main purpose of a
firearm in the possession of a drug dealer is to protect the drugs.65 Thus,
drug dealing is not a “tame” felony, but rather one that ubiquitously involves
violence.66 For that reason, a categorical ban on the possession of firearms
by such a felon is “presumptively lawful” under Heller.67

2. United States v. Booker

Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d at 113.
Britt v. State, 363 N.C. 546 (N.C. 2009).
Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d at 113.
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 113.
Id.
United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24.
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Defendant, Booker, was found in possession of seven firearms eight
years after he was convicted of assault against his then-wife.68 He was
indicted on two counts of knowing possession of a firearm by an individual
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).69 In his motion to dismiss, he argued that § 922(g)(9)’s
restriction on individual possession of firearms violates the Second
Amendment.70 The First Circuit referenced the Heller decision in order to
delineate that there are “presumptively lawful” regulations which apply to
categories of individuals whose gun possession, ownership, and/or use may
be regulated without violating the Second Amendment.71 Citing the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Skoien, the First Circuit asserted that
“preventing armed mayhem” is an undeniably important governmental
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objective.72 It further referenced figures collected by the Justice Department
on the increased risk of homicide by convicted domestic abusers with guns
and the recidivism rates of domestic violence. From this data, the court
concluded that § 922(g)(9) substantially promotes the government interest of
preventing domestic gun violence.73

3. Pineiro v. Gemme

United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010).
Booker, 644 F.3d at 25–26.
Pineiro v. Gemme, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117749 at *2–3 (2011).
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *11–12.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *13.
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Plaintiff, Pineiro, applied for an unrestricted license to carry in
Massachusetts as a result of the violent crimes occurring around his office
building.74 Such an unrestricted license would allow him to carry a
concealed weapon in public for self-defense. However, he was granted a
license subject to the restriction that he use his firearms only for the purpose
of sport and target-shooting.75 Massachusetts courts have distinguished
between a “proper purpose” for obtaining a firearm and a “suitable person”
determination as separate requirements for distributing a license to carry in
the state.76 Here, Plaintiff’s stated purpose for applying for a license was to
avoid “spend[ing] his entire life behind locked doors [and to prevent
becoming] a potential victim of crimes.”77 The licensing authority decided
that this was not a sufficient reason to grant a concealed carry license.78
Plaintiff claimed the statute’s “suitable person” standard violated his
Second Amendment rights because it was “subjective and unattainable.”79
Plaintiff also challenged the state law’s “proper purpose” requirement, which
requires an applicant to show that the license is being sought with “good
reason to fear injury to his person or property.”80 Plaintiff asserted that selfdefense is a “core lawful purpose” protected by the Second Amendment (as
was stated in Heller) and thereby the state was not permitted to further limit
gun possession.81 Finally, Plaintiff challenged the licensing authority’s
power to decide whether to impose restrictions on an applicant’s ability to
carry a weapon, arguing that this power is unconstitutional.82
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In deciding on these issues, the court considered whether or not to apply
the Pullman abstention. This principle was designed on the premise that
“federal courts should not adjudicate the constitutionality of state enactments
fairly open to interpretation until the state courts have been afforded a
reasonable opportunity to pass upon them.”83 Abstention is appropriate only
where (1) the state law is ambiguous and (2) deciding the issue regarding the
state law may avoid the need to resolve a significant federal constitutional
question.84 The court ruled that the Pullman abstention did not apply to
Plaintiff’s first claim because “suitable person” had been clearly defined in
Massachusetts case law to mean “a person who is sufficiently responsible
and skilled with firearms to hold a license without posing a risk to public
safety.”85 “Good reason to fear injury” is likewise clearly defined in
Massachusetts case law;86 the statute requires that an applicant demonstrate
some specific circumstance giving rise to fear beyond the risks faced by the
public at large.87 The court also ruled that the delegation of license
The Appeals Court of
restriction authority was unambiguous.88
Massachusetts ruled in Ruggiero v. Police Commissioner of Boston that
determinations relating to the “suitable person” and “proper purpose”
requirements may only be reversed if they are “arbitrary, capricious or an
abuse of discretion.”89

4. Summary and Application

Pineiro, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117749 at *14.
Id.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *22.
Id. at *22–23.
Id. at *25.
Ruggiero v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 256, 261 (1984).
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In U.S. v. Torres-Rosario, the court shied away from creating a
precedent of case-by-case analysis and instead decided that certain
dangerous individuals may be prohibited from possessing or purchasing
firearms via a categorical ban. The First Circuit reasoned that allowing drug
dealers to possess guns for the purpose of defending their drugs was not a
purpose protected by the Second Amendment, based on its interpretation of
the Heller decision. Because ERPO laws specifically address individuals
who exhibit dangerous behaviors and because these individuals’ main
purpose for possessing a firearm is likely to harm others or themselves (and
not for self-defense), it is likely that a claim against an ERPO law would
yield a result comparable to that in U.S. v. Torres-Rosario.
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By the same logic used in U.S. v. Booker, the First Circuit will certainly
deem it appropriate to prevent mentally ill individuals from possessing,
owning, or using firearms, as this category of individuals is explicitly
mentioned in the Heller decision. If the court decides that this categorical
prohibition would help keep deadly weapons out of the hands of individuals
that pose a potential danger to the public, then ERPOs should likewise be
permissible since they also target individuals who pose a risk of danger to
themselves or others. The decision in Booker thus makes it likely that a
challenge to an ERPO law in the First Circuit would be unsuccessful
because, as the court stated in Booker, protecting against gun violence is an
important and legitimate government interest.90
The decision in Pineiro v. Gemme suggests that questions relating to
requirements similar to Massachusetts’s “suitable person” and “proper
purpose” requirements may be raised in an attempt to implement an ERPO
law. However, as the court ruled in Pineiro, a claim will not require a
constitutional review if the state statute in question is not ambiguous.

B. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
1. Libertarian Party v. Cuomo

United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 26 (1st Cir. 2011).
Libertarian Party v. Cuomo, 300 F. Supp. 3d 424, 430 (W.D.N.Y. 2018).
Id. at 442 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 443.
Id. at 443–44.
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The plaintiffs in this case argued that New York State’s firearms
licensing laws—which required a showing of good moral character and
proper cause—were unconstitutional.91 In considering their case, the court
defined the core Second Amendment right as the “right to possess handguns
in defense of hearth and home.”92 While the New York laws encroached on
this right, they did so to a marginal degree; “law-abiding, responsible citizens
face[d] nothing more than time, expense, and questioning of close friends or
relatives.”93 The laws were designed to ensure that “only law-abiding,
responsible citizens [were] allowed to possess a firearm . . . by ensuring that
classes of individuals who [did] not have the necessary character and
qualities to possess firearms [were] not able to do so.”94 Therefore, the court
ruled in favor of the defendants.
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2. State v. Hope
The Connecticut Appellate Court ruled that similar restrictions of up to
one year on those who pose a risk of imminent physical harm to themselves
or others was “an example of the longstanding presumptively lawful
regulatory measures articulated in [Heller].”95 Therefore, the court
concluded that the statute in question did not violate the Second
Amendment.96

3. Connecticut’s Risk Warrant Gun Removal Law

02/26/2019 14:13:21

95. Hope v. State, 163 Conn. App. 36, 43 (2016).
96. Id. at 43.
97. See, Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut’s RiskBased Gun Removal Law: Does it Prevent Suicides? 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 180 (2017).
98. Id. at 180.
99. Id. at 205.
100. Id. at 189.
101. Id. at 205–08.
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Connecticut was the first state to pass a law in 1999 authorizing police
to temporarily remove guns from individuals who they had probable cause
to believe posed a danger to themselves or others. The law was passed after
a highly publicized mass shooting in the state. Part of the design of this
Connecticut risk warrant gun removal law was meant to ensure that the
respondent whose guns were being removed would retain his or her due
process rights. These precautions included a three-fold review process,
including a reflection on the situation and facts at hand by the police, the
State’s Attorney, and a judge.97
Following the passing of this law, researchers at Duke University began
conducting a study to analyze the outcomes of the law.98 The study spanned
from 1999 through 2013. During the interviews conducted as part of the
study, a number of individuals expressed concern over the effectiveness of
having such a cumbersome three-fold review process, and it was this concern
which prevented more extensive application of the Connecticut law.99 In
spite of these extensive hurdles to implementation, the study did see a
noticeable increase of the number of gun removal cases following the mass
shooting at Virginia Tech University in 2007.100 Overall, the study
concluded that the Connecticut law was a useful tool for preventing gun
violence, and for reducing suicide rates in particular.101
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4. Summary and Application
The lack of relevant case law in the Second Circuit does not yield any
certain conclusions in this jurisdiction. However, Libertarian Party v.
Cuomo established that a restriction on firearm possession based on an
individual’s moral character and fitness is permissible. This suggests that a
comparable restriction based on the risk an individual poses to themselves or
others may similarly be argued to encroach only marginally on the core right
of the Second Amendment. State v. Hope further suggests that a one-year
protective order constructed like that in California will likely not meet
opposition as to the length of time for which the ban spans.
While the Connecticut study is somewhat persuasive and reveals some
correlation between the implementation of the law and a decrease in gun
violence and gun-related suicides in particular, it is not a conclusive study.
It also questions the plausibility of implementing such a cumbersome review
process in every jurisdiction. Further, it is a limited version of an ERPO
(allowing only the police to petition for a warrant to remove an individual’s
firearms) and therefore the findings are of limited scope.

C. United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
1. Keyes v. Lynch

Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 706–07 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
Id. at 719.
Id. at 719–20.
Id. at 719.
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Plaintiff Yox was involuntarily committed to psychiatric hospital when
he was 15 years old, while he was grappling with his parents’ divorce.102
Plaintiff rested his argument on the assumption that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Heller prohibited firearm possession by persons who are
currently mentally ill.103 On the other hand, Defendants’ relied on the theory
that all persons who have experienced some form of mental illness at some
point in their lives are more prone to violent or dangerous behavior and are,
thereby, the exact class of individuals the Supreme Court meant to prohibit
from firearm possession.104 The court in this case acknowledged that there
are certain mental illnesses, such as anxiety and ADHD, that may be
considered more “temporary” and not dangerous.105 While it is unclear what
the Supreme Court meant to include under the umbrella term of “mentally
ill,” this court reasoned that, at the very least, that definition must include
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individuals who had mental impairments that made them a danger to
themselves or others.106
Here, Defendants failed to provide evidence of any subsequent episodes
of mental illness exhibited by Yox or that he misused firearms in his
professional capacity.107 Though Yox exhibited behavior dangerous to
himself and possibly others when he was involuntarily committed, the court
decided that there was no current “continuing threat.”108 (The psychological
evaluation, which said as much, proved especially convincing.) The court
therefore ruled in favor of Yox on his Second Amendment claim.109

2. Summary and Application
Though sparse, case law in the Third Circuit’s jurisdiction suggests that
the existence of mental illness alone is not an automatic and absolute bar to
possession of a firearm. That the court in Keyes differentiated certain mental
illnesses as temporary and not dangerous may provide an argument against
certain ERPO petitions that may be brought, if such laws were to be
introduced into this jurisdiction. For example, if an individual exhibited
dangerous behaviors, prompting a relative to file for an ERPO, that
individual may be able to argue at his or her hearing that the dangerous
behaviors were a temporary effect of a mental illness rather than an episode
that may reoccur in the future. A psychological evaluation affirming that
argument would prove particularly persuading, as in the case with Yox.
However, this case alone is not necessarily dispositive of whether an ERPO
law as a whole would encounter issues that would make implementation
impossible in this jurisdiction.

1. United States v. Chapman
Defendant, Chapman, attempted to kill himself and shoot his ex-wife
with at least three firearms in his possession at the time.110 Defendant’s thengirlfriend subsequently filed a domestic violence protective order against
him, which he contested on the basis of a violation of his right to selfdefense.111 The Fourth Circuit refrained from deciding on the Second

Keyes, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 719–20.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 722.
United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 224.
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Amendment challenge in this case because it determined that this was
unnecessary given that the law in question survives intermediate scrutiny.112
In the court’s opinion, the law survived intermediate scrutiny because it
constituted an “exceedingly narrow” “prohibitory sweep.”113
As part of its argument, the government provided social science
evidence proving that:
(1) domestic violence is a serious problem in the U.S., (2) the rate
of recidivism among domestic violence misdemeanants is
substantial, (3) the use of firearms in connection with domestic
violence is all too common, (4) the use of firearms in connection
with domestic violence increases the risk of injury or homicide
during a domestic violence incident, and (5) the use of firearms
in connection with domestic violence often leads to injury or
homicide.114
The court found this evidence persuasive in showing that the
government met its burden of establishing a reasonable fit between the
substantial governmental objective of preventing domestic gun violence and
keeping firearms out of the hands of domestic abusers.

2. United States v. Conrad

Chapman, 666 F.3d at 228.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 230.
United States v. Conrad, 923 F. Supp. 2d 843, 851 (W.D. Va. 2013).
Id. at 850.
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The court concluded here that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits
firearm possession by unlawful users of controlled substances, does not
violate the Second Amendment.115 The law passes the intermediate scrutiny
standard because it is limited in its temporal scope and because the
government submitted sufficient evidence demonstrating a “nexus between
controlled substances and crime.”116 With regard to the temporal scope, the
law prohibits firearm possession only if the individual is currently a user or
addict. The prohibition ends when a person is no longer using drugs. With
regard to the nexus, the government provided scientific studies affirming
their stance.
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3. United States v. Mudlock
Defendant, Mudlock, was arrested after he called 911 stating he was
going to kill himself and that he would shoot any law enforcement officer
who approached his home to stop him.117 During this time, Defendant had a
domestic restraining order filed against him, barring him from possessing a
firearm for one year.118 Defendant challenged the restraining order, arguing
that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) violated his Second Amendment rights.119 The
Fourth Circuit disagreed because § 922(g)(8) provides a time-limited
restriction, a hearing prior to the triggering of the firearm restriction, and was
put in place for the purpose of avoiding reasonable fear of bodily injury. The
court thereby found that there was a reasonable fit between the statute and
“the substantial governmental objective of reducing domestic gun
violence.”120

4. Summary and Application

E. United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
1. United States v. Anderson
Defendant, Anderson, challenged his conviction as a felon in possession
of a firearm by arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violated his Second
Amendment rights.121 The court reaffirmed its previous decision,122 holding
United States v. Mudlock, 483 F. App’x 823, 825 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 826.
Mudlock, 483 F. App’x at 826.
Id. at 828.
United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632, 633–34 (5th Cir. 2003).
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Based on the rulings in Chapman, Conrad, and Mudlock, if an ERPO
survives intermediate scrutiny, then a Second Amendment challenge will not
be considered. It is likely that this will be the case because ERPOs are
targeted specifically at a group of individuals deemed by those close to them
to exhibit dangerous behavior. Therefore, a law aimed at preventing any
dangerous behavior by keeping firearms out of the hands of those likely to
be engaged in such dangerous behavior meets the reasonable fit test under
intermediate scrutiny. An ERPO further passes the intermediate scrutiny
standard because it provides for only a temporary (one-year) prohibition of
firearm possession, as in Conrad and Mudlock. Similar to statute at issue in
those cases, an ERPO law also requires a hearing prior to the actual
triggering of the firearm prohibition.
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that § 922(g) does not violate the Second Amendment and that Heller
provided no basis for reconsidering that decision.123 According to the Fifth
Circuit’s precedent, “limited, narrowly tailored exceptions or restrictions for
particular cases that are reasonable and not inconsistent with the right of
Americans generally to individually keep and bear their private arms as
historically understood in this country . . .”124 Further, the Fifth Circuit
previously noted that “those of unsound mind may be prohibited from
possessing firearms.”125

2. Piscitello v. Bragg
The District Court for the Western District of Texas rejected Piscitello’s
Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which makes it
unlawful for a person using a controlled substance to possess a firearm.126
The court reasoned that the Supreme Court explained in Heller that there are
certain exceptions to the right to possess a firearm.127 While certain
exceptions were enumerated in the Heller decision, the Supreme Court noted
that the list was not meant to be exhaustive, implying that there are other
categories of exceptions which Congress could regulate.128 The court thus
concluded that Congress’s determination that the prohibition of firearm
possession by those unlawfully using or addicted to controlled substances is
consistent with “well-rooted, public-safety-based-exceptions to the Second
Amendment right.”129

3. Summary and Application

Anderson, 559 F.3d at 352.
United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 261.
Piscitello v. Bragg, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21658 at *11 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
Id. at *12.
Id.
Id.
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The reasoning in the Fifth Circuit’s precedents, cited in Anderson,
suggests the court would uphold an ERPO law because it is designed to
temporarily prohibit firearm possession by “those of unsound mind,” so long
as the ERPO law is applied in a narrow set of “reasonable” cases. The
rationale in Piscitello suggests that an ERPO law would be upheld since such
laws are similarly based on reasonable determinations that people who
demonstrably pose a danger to themselves or others should not be allowed
to have easy access to firearms.
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F. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
1. Stimmel v. Sessions
Plaintiff, Stimmel, was barred from purchasing a firearm under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) due to his prior conviction of misdemeanor domestic
violence.130 In his appeal, Plaintiff argues that § 922(g)(9) placed an
unconstitutional burden on his Second Amendment rights.131 The court
reasoned that the core of the Second Amendment’s protections pertain to the
rights of “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” which lends itself to the
presumption that some individuals may not fall under such a characterization
and would thereby be “disqualified from exercising Second Amendment
Thus, the court determined that “some categorical
rights.”132
disqualifications are permissible” in order to enforce important
governmental interests, such as protecting victims of domestic violence.133

2. Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department

Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 201.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 210–11.
Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 684.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 687–88.
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Plaintiff, Tyler, was involuntarily committed to a mental hospital nearly
thirty years ago after his wife of over two decades left him for another
man.134 In the years between his hospital discharge in 1986 and 2012, there
was no evidence of mental illness.135 Despite this fact, Tyler was denied the
purchase of a gun in 2011. His chief challenge in the present case was that
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) unconstitutionally placed a permanent ban on his
fundamental right to bear arms.136 Here, the court decided not to blindly
apply the statute, which the Supreme Court expressly enumerated as a
“presumptively lawful” restriction in Heller.137 Instead, it reasoned that an
individual who was previously involuntarily committed should be allowed
to argue against 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) if he or she believes that they no
longer poses a danger to society.138
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3. Summary and Application
The decision in Tyler suggests that prior involuntary commitment to a
mental institution does not equate to current mental illness, and that the
federal law thereby does not automatically bar individuals who were once
involuntary committed from possessing firearms. In contrast, ERPOs are
targeted at dispossessing people who are shown to pose a current danger to
themselves or others. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the Sixth
Circuit could uphold an ERPO law because it relies on indications of
dangerous behaviors which suggest the individual is currently a danger
and/or mentally ill. Further, as the court decided in Stimmel, such a
categorical ban on a group of individuals is permissible if it reasonably
serves to enforce the governmental interest of public safety.

G. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
1. United States v. Skoien
Defendant, Skoien, had twice been convicted of misdemeanor crimes
of domestic violence when he was found in possession of a shotgun.139 As a
condition of his guilty plea, he reserved the right to bring a facial challenge
against 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).140 The court reasoned that Section 922(g)(9)
was rooted in the belief that people who have been convicted of a violent
offense in the past are more likely to commit similarly violent acts in the
future.141 Therefore, it becomes imperative to keep “the most lethal weapon”
out of the hands of domestic violence misdemeanants.142 By this logic, the
court decided to uphold Section 922(g)(9) against Defendant’s facial
challenge.143

The court here reasoned that Congress intended to exclude certain
individuals who are “presumptively risky people” from possessing firearms
by passing section 922(g) of the federal code.144 Congress acted within its
constitutional bounds in doing so because it is “substantially related to the
important governmental interest in preventing violent crime.”145 The court
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 645.
United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 687.
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also drew an analogy between habitual drug abusers and the mentally ill,
stating that both categories of individuals “are more likely to have difficulty
exercising self-control, making it dangerous for them to possess deadly
firearms.”146 Further, with respect to commitment to a mental institution, the
court appeared to decide that such a commitment legitimizes a lifetime ban
on firearm possession.147

3. Rhein v. Pryor
The Illinois Compiled Statutes (the “ILCS”) contain a provision that
allows the Illinois Department of State Police to revoke an individual’s
license to acquire or possess a firearm if the Department finds that, at the
time of issuance, the individual’s mental condition was “of such a nature that
it pose[d] a clear and present danger to the applicant, any other person or
persons or the community.”148 The ILCS was recently amended to define
“clear and present danger” as:
[A] person who: (1) communicates a serious threat of physical
violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or poses a clear
and imminent risk of serious physical injury to himself, herself,
or another person as determined by a physician, clinical
psychologist, or qualified examiner; or (2) demonstrates
threatening physical or verbal behavior, such as violent, suicidal,
or assaultive threats, actions, or other behavior, as determined by
a physician, clinical psychologist, qualified examiner, school
administrator, or law enforcement official.149

Yancey, 621 F.3d at 685.
Id. at 686.
430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/8 (LEXIS through 2017 Legis. Sess.).
430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/1.1 (LEXIS through 2017 Legis. Sess.).
Rhein v. Pryor, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36305 at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2014).
Id. at *17.
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4. Summary and Application
The decision in Skoien to uphold 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) against facial
challenges bodes well for the passage of an ERPO law in the Seventh Circuit.
The court’s decision hinged on the amount of scientific proof regarding the
high rate of recidivism of domestic abusers and the danger posed to partners
and spouses of those abusers. Similarly, the studies done by the Consortium
for Risk-Based Firearms Policy and the FBI show clear signs of concerning
conduct which are often readily apparent to those closest to a potential
shooter in the time leading up to that shooter’s attack. Such a present threat
to public safety should not be overlooked, and, in light of the Skoien decision,
the Seventh Circuit may be open to such a comparison.
Further, the decision in Yancey suggests that the Seventh Circuit would
uphold an ERPO law because it is “substantially related to the important
governmental interest in preventing violent crime.”152 Under Yancey, the
Seventh Circuit also appears more stringent than other circuits—like the
Sixth Circuit, for example—by ruling in favor of the lifetime ban of
individuals who were once committed to mental institutions. It will thus be
more difficult for individuals to bring a claim against an ERPO law based on
the argument that there is no evidence of continued or reoccurring mental
illness after an earlier commitment to a mental institution.
The Rhein decision suggests that an ERPO law could be integrated in
the Northern District of Illinois since the ILCS already provides for much of
the restrictions contained in California’s ERPO law. In fact, the ILCS
appears to be more restrictive because it allows for an indefinite revocation
of firearm possession for individuals who displayed evidence of mental
illness at the time of the issuance of their license.

1. United States v. Bena
In its analysis of the constitutionality of domestic violence restrictions
on firearm possession, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that, even though federal
law did not prohibit firearm possession by the mentally ill until 1968,
Congress had long since sought to keep firearms out of the possession of
dangerous classes of individuals.153 Because this type of restriction is in
place to “promote the government’s interest in public safety consistent with
our common law tradition,” the court held that the Second Amendment does

Yancey, 621 F.3d at 687.
United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1182–83 (8th Cir. 2011).
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not prohibit such restrictions.154 This reasoning is consistent with classical
republican philosophy, which tied the right to bear arms with being a
“virtuous citizen.”155

2. United States v. Seay
Defendant, Seay, was convicted of distrusting and possessing
marijuana.156 During a search subsequent to his arrest, police found four
firearms at Defendant’s residence. He was thereby indicted for possessing a
firearm while using a controlled substance in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(3). Defendant argued that the indictment violated his Second
Amendment rights.157 However, the court refrained from considering
Defendant’s arguments. In so doing, it cited past decisions within the circuit
as well as in other circuits which dictated that this and other sections of §
922(g) are facially constitutional.158

3. Summary and Application
Bena suggests that the Eighth Circuit would uphold an ERPO law
because it is aimed specifically at individuals who pose a danger to
themselves or others, which the Eighth Circuit held was not a restriction
prohibited by the Second Amendment. Further, it would be difficult for a
defendant in the Eighth Circuit to argue that an ERPO is facially
unconstitutional as comparable sections of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) have been
held to be constitutional, as was reiterated in Seay.

I. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Plaintiff, Pyles, was working as a transportation planner at the Oregon
Department of Transportation when he began suffering from “perceived
mental decline” in 2009.159 When told he was being placed on administrative
leave by his manager, Plaintiff caused a scene in the office for about 20
minutes before he was escorted off the premises by police officers.160
Plaintiff’s actions on that day were so violent that, in the days that followed,
Bena, 664 F.3d at 1184.
Id. at 1183.
United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 920 (8th Cir. 2010).
Seay, 620 F.3d at 920.
Id. at 924.
Pyles v. Winters, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96227 at *2 (D. Or. July, 9, 2013).
Id. at *2–3.
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many of his co-workers felt unsafe even when they got home after work.161
As a result, Plaintiff’s district manager notified the local Sheriff’s Office of
the events that occurred and asked that Plaintiff’s activities be monitored, in
case Plaintiff returned to the office and displayed further violent behavior.162
Two days after he was told he was going to be placed on administrative
leave, Plaintiff purchased a firearm and the district manager was notified of
the purchase.163 Further investigation revealed that Plaintiff had actually
purchased three firearms in those two days—two handguns and an AK-type
assault rifle.164 Plaintiff claimed the timing of these purchases was merely
coincidental and that he believed he never posed a danger to anyone,
including himself.165 Police seized Plaintiff’s firearms soon thereafter and
he was transported to a hospital for a mental health evaluation. The
evaluation did not indicate that Plaintiff was a danger to himself or others.166
Plaintiff argued that the seizure of his firearms was a violation of his Second
Amendment rights, particularly because the mental health evaluation proved
that he was not mentally ill.167
The court ruled that the results of the mental health evaluation were
irrelevant; it did not matter that Plaintiff was not actually mentally ill.168 The
police lawfully seized Plaintiff’s firearms because they had probable cause
to suspect that Plaintiff might be mentally ill and a danger to himself or
others.169 Furthermore, Plaintiff’s firearms were returned to him “within a
reasonable amount of time” following the results of his mental health
evaluation.170 Therefore, Plaintiff’s Second Amendment claim was
dismissed.

2. United States v. Garretson

Pyles, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96227 at *4.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2–4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6–7.
Pyles, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96227 at *8.
Id. at *16.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Garretson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154246 at *2–4 (D. Nev. June 12,
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there was an Extended Order for Protection Against Domestic Violence filed
against Defendant. He was therefore indicted for possession of firearms in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).172 Against this, Defendant argued the
statute violated his Second Amendment rights, as applied.173
The court referred to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Mahin, in which the Fourth Circuit ruled that § 922(g)(8)’s prohibition was
“temporally limited and therefore ‘exceedingly narrow.’”174 The temporary
burden is only instated to prevent “a particular risk of future abuse.”175 Here,
the court decided that the mere one-year duration of the domestic violence
order—which was shorter than the two year duration at issue in Mahin—
along with the credible threat to the physical safety of an intimate partner
was enough justification to enforce § 922(g)(8), as applied, upon
Defendant.176

3. Summary and Application

J. United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
1. United States v. Gillman
Defendant, Gillman, was found in possession of a firearm after his exgirlfriend filed a protective order against him. He contested the

Garretson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154246 at *3-4.
Id. at *6.
United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 125 (4th Cir. 2012).
Garretson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154246 at *18.
Id. at *18–20.
Pyles, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96227 at *16.
Garretson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154246 at *18.
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Pyles implies that a mental health evaluation proving the lack of a threat
of danger to one’s self or others is irrelevant, so long as the firearms are
seized upon probable cause and are returned to the owner “within a
reasonable amount of time” after the mental health evaluation is
conducted.177
The decision in Garretson further enforces the
constitutionality of a temporary burden on one’s Second Amendment rights
when there is threat of physical safety.178 Together, these decisions suggest
the Ninth Circuit would likely uphold an ERPO law because ERPOs are
temporary and imposed against those who are a danger to themselves or
others. Once the one-year period lapses, the order may be renewed, but if it
is not renewed, then the individual may request the return of his or her
firearms.
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constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), arguing that that section of the
statute unduly punishes people who do not pose a threat to public safety and,
as applied to him, restricted his Second Amendment rights even though there
was no evidence that he posed a danger to anyone.179 Defendant maintained
that the protective order held against him was based on a property crime—
slashing his ex-girlfriend’s tires—rather than threat of bodily harm and
therefore he should not be subject to § 922(g)(8).
Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, the United States
District Court for the District of Utah reasoned that, while there is no clear
definition for a “presumptively lawful” restriction, § 922(g)(8) likely falls
under this category.180 Section 922(g)(8) is narrower in scope and “more
limited in its temporal applicability” when compared to the statute at issue
in Heller.181 The statute here targeted a limited group of citizens who may
present legitimate concerns in relation to the safety of an intimate partner
and is therefore narrow in scope.182 Thus, the court upheld the federal statute
as applied against the Defendant.

2. Summary and Application
Case law is limited in this circuit and therefore no definitive conclusion
can be drawn. However, the narrow scope and temporal applicability of
ERPOs are comparable to that of § 922(g)(8), suggesting that an ERPO law
will likely be upheld, at least in the limited jurisdiction of the Central
Division of the District of Utah.

K. United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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179. Garretson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154246 at *4.
180. Id. at *7.
181. Id.
182. Id. at *8.
183. United States v. McIlwain, 772 F.3d 688, 698 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27); see also United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771
(11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (holding that “statutory restrictions of firearm possession, such as §
922(g)(1), are a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of
people” and the plaintiff, “by virtue of his felony conviction, falls within such a class”).
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the Eleventh Circuit might uphold an ERPO law as a similar statutory
restriction of firearm possession for certain classes of people who have been
determined more likely to be a danger to themselves or others.

L. United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
1. Schrader v. Holder
Plaintiff, Schrader, was convicted of misdemeanor assault and battery
forty years prior to the filing of this case. When he was subsequently denied
the purchase of a firearm forty years after the conviction, he learned that he
was barred from doing so under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).184 In considering
Plaintiff’s constitutional challenge, the court reasoned that Congress
originally enacted the statute to keep firearms away from individuals “who
might be expected to misuse them.”185 The court ruled that § 922(g)(1)
survived intermediate scrutiny because disarming “common-law
misdemeanants as a class is substantially related to the important
governmental objective” of preventing gun violence.186

2. Summary and Application
The reasoning in Schrader is applicable in the ERPO context because it
suggests an ERPO law would survive intermediate scrutiny because it is
based on a similar rationale that people “expected to misuse” firearms may
permissibly be prohibited from possessing them. Thus, though there is
limited case law, the ruling in Schrader bodes well for the success of an
ERPO law in this jurisdiction.

Something needs to be done about the amount of gun violence in this
country. For many years, the shooting at Columbine High School in 1999
was referred to as one of the deadliest massacres in history. Now, it is no
longer even among the 10 deadliest shootings in modern U.S. history.187
While there continues to be debate over the true cause of these repeated mass

02/26/2019 14:13:21

184. Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 982-83 (2013).
185. Id. at 990.
186. Id. at 990.
187. AJ Willingham et al., 19 years ago, Columbine shook American to its core. Now, it’s not
even among the 10 deadliest shootings in modern US history, CNN (Apr. 20, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/07/health/deadliest-mass-shootings-columbine-in-modern-ushistory-trnd/index.html.
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shootings, there is at least a proven correlation between more guns and
higher firearm homicide rates.188 Due to the Supreme Court precedent in
D.C. v. Heller, the control the NRA exerts on Congress,189 and the anti-gun
control sentiments of at least one third of the American population,190 it is
unlikely that a strong-headed movement in the direction of general gun
restrictions will yield any results. One compromise, that has been agreed
upon by representatives on both sides of the political divide as an acceptable
means through which to at least rein in the amount of access to guns by those
who pose a danger to themselves or others, is the type of ERPO law that
exists in California, Washington, Oregon, Florida, Delaware, Illinois,
Maryland, and Massachusetts.
While only time will tell whether such a law will be passed in each of
the remaining 42 states, this Note posits that passage of ERPO laws in each
of the 12 circuits is plausible and perhaps even necessary. Existing case law
in each of these jurisdictions has shown that the limited and specific nature
of ERPOs will likely withstand a constitutional challenge. All that stands in
the way of the passage of such laws is an unwillingness to place boundaries
on Second Amendment rights.
Hopefully, this incorrect perception of common sense gun laws will be
changed in the coming years, because the reality is that these limited
restrictions on firearm ownership are not aimed at infringing on individual
rights. Rather, they are aimed at protecting innocent lives from gun violence.
If lawmakers can be persuaded to simply shift their point of view, it becomes
an easy decision to pass minimally-restrictive, common sense gun laws to
protect American citizens from the dangers of guns when placed in the wrong
hands.
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188. Max Fisher et al., What Explains U.S. Mass Shootings? International Comparisons
Suggest an Answer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/world/amer
icas/mass-shootings-us-international.html.
189. See, e.g. Dominic Rushe, Why is the National Rifle Association so powerful?, THE
GUARDIAN (May 4, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/nov/17/nra-gun-lobbygun-control-congress.
190. Steven Shepard, Gun control support surges in polls, POLITICO (Feb. 28, 2018), https://w
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